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C A S E S  A N D  C A S E  N O T E S *  
 
 
Case: ECJ – Courage v Crehan 
 
Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan 
and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, Case C-453/99, [2001] ECR 
I-6297 
 
Summary of the Judgment: 
 
1.  A party to a contract  liable to restrict or distort  competition within the meaning of Ar- 
ticle 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC) can rely on the breach of that provision to obtain 
relief from the other contracting party. 
2.  The full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 81 EC) and, in particular, 
the practical effect of the prohibition laid down  in Article 85(1) would  be put at risk if it 
were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract  or 
by conduct  liable to restrict  or distort  competition. Indeed,  the existence of such a right 
strengthens the working  of the Community competition rules and discourages agreements 
or practices, which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
Article 85 of the Treaty therefore  precludes a rule of national law under which a party to a 
contract  liable to restrict  or distort  competition within  the meaning  of that  provision  is 
barred from claiming damages for loss caused by performance of that contract  on the sole 
ground  that the claimant is a party to that contract. 
However, in the absence of Community rules governing  the matter,  it is for the domestic 
legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction 
and to lay down  the detailed  procedural  rules governing  actions  for safeguarding  rights 
which individuals  derive directly  from Community law, provided  that such rules are not 
less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and 
that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred  by Community law (principle of effectiveness). 
Under  those conditions, Community law does not preclude  national  law from denying  a 
party who is found  to bear significant responsibility for the distortion of competition the 
right to obtain  damages from the other  contracting party.  Under  a principle  which is re- 
cognised  in most  of the  legal systems  of the  Member  States and  which  the  Court has 
applied in the past, a litigant should not profit from his own unlawful conduct,  where this 
is proven. 
In particular,  it is for the national court to ascertain whether  the party who claims to have 
suffered loss through concluding  a contract  that is liable to restrict or distort  competition 
found himself in a markedly  weaker position  than the other party, such as seriously to 
compromise  or even eliminate his freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract and his ca- 
pacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent, in particular by availing himself in good time of 
all the legal remedies available to him. 
 
*   The  full  text  of  the  judgments  is available at  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/ 
search_case.html. 
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Case Note 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In Courage the European Court of Justice has recognised that any individual 
– including a party to a restrictive contract  – can claim compensation for loss 
caused by a violation of Article 81or 82 EC. The Courage judgment builds on 
the Francovich case law on state liability for violations  of Community law.1 
Courage does not expressly state that the right of an individual to claim dam- 
ages in case of competition law violations  has a Community law basis, al- 
though  the author  submits,  with  others,  that  it has. One  thing  is sure: this 
right is also vested in an individual who suffers from a competition law viola- 
tion by the conclusion  of a contract  to which he or she is a party. The Court 
reacts to a limitation  that existed under English contract  law. 
 
Present initiatives at the EC level and recent legislation in some Member Sta- 
tes (like the UK and Germany) aim at granting individuals  specific rights to 
compensation in case of competition law violations. Provisions of some other 
existing competition laws need to be reconsidered in the light of Courage (as 
a judgment  of the Italian Supreme Court of 2002 illustrates). 
 
The present case note will focus on the consequences  of Courage for contract 
law. The case raises questions  as to the traditional distinction  between  con- 
tractual  and extra-contractual liability.  Competition law blurs  that  distinc- 
tion. 
 
 
II.  The preliminary reference and its legal context 
 
In 1991 Crehan,  the tenant  of a pub,  had agreed with  Courage,  a brewery 
with 19 % share of the market  in sales of beer and owning  the premises, to 
purchase beer exclusively from Courage.  In 1993 Courage  brought an action 
for the recovery  of £ 15,000 for unpaid  deliveries of beer. Crehan’s  defence 
was that the exclusive purchase  obligation  was contrary to Article 81 para 1 
EC (the prohibition of restrictive  agreements and practices which adversely 
affect trade  between  Member  States) and  he counter-claimed for  damages. 
Mr. Crehan  contended that Courage  sold its beers to independent tenants of 
pubs  at substantially lower  prices than  to himself. The price difference, he 
contended, drove him out of business. 
 
1   Joined Cases C-6/90  and C-9/90  Francovich and Others  [1991] ECR I-5357 (ECJ) and 
subsequent case law, see summarising  this case law and the case law on non contractual 
liability  of the  institutions: Case C-352/98  Laboratoires  pharmacuetiques  Bergaderm 
[2000] ECR I-5291 (ECJ). 
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The Court of Appeal of England and Wales considered  that English law did 
not  allow a party  to an illegal agreement  to claim damages from  the other 
party, but wondered whether that rule was compatible  with Community law. 
 
 
III.  The Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
Advocate  General  Mischo  delivered  his opinion  on 22 March  2001. A first 
question  put by the Court of Appeal was whether  a correct interpretation of 
Article 81 EC could exclude a contract  party  from relying, in court,  on Ar- 
ticle 81 EC to seek relief from the other party. This question  could easily be 
dealt with: Article 81 EC constitutes  a fundamental  provision  the useful ef- 
fect of which would be frustrated if it could not be relied upon by a co-con- 
tractor. 
 
As to the question  whether  a party  to a contract  can claim compensation if 
the contract violates Article 81 EC, the Advocate General first recalled that it 
is settled case-law that Article 81 EC produces  direct effects in relations  be- 
tween the individuals  concerned  which the courts  must safeguard.2   This in- 
cludes the right, for individuals, to be protected  from the harmful effects that 
an agreement  which is automatically void may create.3  The individuals  who 
can benefit from such protection are, of course, primarily third parties, that is 
to say consumers 4 and competitors who are adversely affected by a prohibit- 
ed agreement.5  Parties  to  the  agreement  cannot  normally  benefit  form  the 
same protection because they are the cause of the agreement. This is by virtue 
of the application  of a principle  of law, recognised  in most  developed  legal 
systems, including the Community system, according to which a party  may 
 
 
 
2   Case 127/73 BRT  v Sabam [1974] ECR 51 (ECJ); Case C-234/89  Delimitis v Heninger 
Bräu [1991] ECR I-935 (ECJ); this holds a fortiori  since the entry into force of Regula- 
tion 1/2003. Pursuant to this new implementing  regulation Article 81 EC can be applied 
as a whole by national courts and authorities. ‘Declarations  of inapplicability’ for agree- 
ments satisfying the conditions of art 81 para 3 – ie restrictive practices which generate 
certain advantages, while passing a fair share thereof to consumers and provided they do 
not contain any restriction which is not indispensable  and do not substantially eliminate 
competition – are not subject anymore  to a notification to and a decision by the Com- 
mission. 
3   Point 37 of the opinion. 
4   For consumers  claiming compensation for loss suffered as a result of eg a cartel may be 
very difficult: see the passing on problem  under paragraph  5.1. 
5   With reference to the opinion  of Advocate general van Gerven in Case C-128/92  Banks 
[1994] ECR  I-1209, points  43 et seq (ECJ), who was the very first to advocate a Com- 
munity right to damages for victims of infringements of the European competition rules. 
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not  profit  from  its own  wrong.6  However, the fact of being a party  to the 
agreement infringing Article 81 EC does not amount  in all circumstances to a 
wrong. The criterion  is whether  the party bears responsibility for the distor- 
tion of competition. If that responsibility is not significant (like that of a pub 
owner who is too small to resist the economic pressure of the other party, the 
brewery),  there is no reason to deny that party  the protection of Article 81 
EC.  Therefore  Community law precludes  a rule, as in English  law, which 
prevents  a party  subject to a clause in a contract  which infringes Article  81 
EC  from recovering  damages for the loss suffered by it on the sole ground 
that it is a party to that contract. 
 
 
IV. The judgment of the Court 
 
The ECJ followed the Advocate General. The Court recalled that the Treaty 
has created  its own  legal order.  Community law is intended  to give rise to 
rights to individuals. Community law has precedence.7 Article 81 EC is a fun- 
damental provision that is essential for the functioning of the internal market. 
Evidence of this can be found in Article 81 para 2 EC: an agreement contrary 
to this provision is automatically void.8  An agreement that is null and void by 
virtue of Article 81 para 2 EC has no effect as between the contracting parties 
and cannot be set up against third parties.9  Moreover,  it is capable of having a 
bearing on all the effects, either past or future,  of the agreement  or decision 
concerned.10 Finally, the Court recalled that it has held that Articles 81 para 1 
and 82 EC (the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position)  produce  direct 
effects in relations between individuals and create rights for the individuals 
concerned which the national courts must safeguard.11 
 
It follows from the foregoing considerations, that any individual can rely on 
a breach of Article 81 para 1 EC 12 before a national court, even where he is a 
 
6 The Advocate general refers to Case C 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101, para- 
graph  10 (ECJ) and the nemo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans principle  in the 
Opinion of A. G. Cosmas in joined Cases C-177/99  and C-181/99  Ampafrance  and Sa- 
nofi [2000] ECR I-7013, points 49 and 83 (ECJ) and his opinion  in Case C-386/89  Cris- 
polton [1991] ECR I-3695, point 46 (ECJ). 
7 See paragraph  19 of the Judgment. 
8 With reference to Case C-126/97  Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055, paragraph  36 (ECJ). 
9 With reference to Case 22/71 Béguelin [1971] ECR 949, paragraph  29 (ECJ). 
10 With  reference  to  Case  48/72  Brasserie de Haecht  II [1973] ECR  77, paragraph  26 
(ECJ). 
11 Case 127/73, n 2 above, paragraph  16; Case C-282/95 P Guérin Automobiles  v Commis- 
sion [1977] ECR I-1503, paragraph  39 (ECJ). 
12 Since the entry  into force of Reg 1/2003, article 1/2003 (including  the third  paragraph) 
seems to be directly effective as a whole (see also n 2). 
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party  to a contract  that is liable to restrict or distort  competition within  the 
meaning of that provision.13 
 
As regards the possibility  of seeking compensation for the loss caused by a 
contract  or by conduct  liable to restrict competition, the Court recalled that 
national courts  must ensure that provisions  of Community law within  their 
jurisdiction take full effect and must protect  the rights which they confer on 
individuals 14  (‘effet utile’ principle).  The full effectiveness of Article  81 EC 
would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for 
loss caused to him by a contract  or by a conduct  liable to restrict  competi- 
tion.15  Actions for damages can indeed make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance  of effective competition in the Community. 
 
There  should  not  therefore  be  any  absolute  bar  to  such  an  action  being 
brought by a party to a contract or to conduct liable to restrict competition.16 
 
However,  the Court  immediately recalled the procedural  autonomy of the 
Member States, ie the right to lay down the procedural rules for bringing such 
actions, subject to the respect of the principles of equivalence (ie these rules 
should not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions) 
and effectiveness (ie these rules should  not render  impossible  or excessively 
difficult  the exercise of the rights  conferred  by Community law).17  In that 
context the Court  has already held that Community law does not prevent na- 
tional courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guar- 
anteed  by  Community law does  not  entail the unjust  enrichment  of those 
who enjoy them.18  Similarly, the Court  conceded that provided the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness are respected, Community law does not 
preclude national law from denying a party who has significant responsibility 
for the distortion of competition the right to obtain damages from the other 
contracting  party.  ‘Under a principle which is recognised in most of the legal 
systems of the Member States and which the Court has applied in the past (see 
Case 39/72 Commission  v  Italy  [1973] ECR  101, paragraph 10], a litigant 
should not profit from his own unlawful  conduct, where this is proven.’ 19 
 
 
13 Paragraph 24 of the judgment. 
14 Paragraph  25 of the judgment  with reference to Case 106/77 Simmentahl [1978] ECR 
629, paragraph  16 (ECJ) and Case C-213/89  Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 
19 (ECJ). 
15 Paragraph 26 of the judgment. 
16 Paragraphs  27 and 28 of the judgment. 
17 Paragraph 29 of the judgment. 
18 Paragraph 30 of the judgment  with reference to ia joined Cases C-441/98  and C-442/98 
Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph  31 (ECJ). 
19 Paragraph 31 of the judgment. 
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In that regard the matters  to be taken into account  by the judge include the 
economic  and legal context  in which the parties find themselves and the re- 
spective bargaining  power  and conduct  of the  two  parties  to the  contract. 
One of these factors is whether the party claiming damages was in a markedly 
weaker  position  than  the other  party,  such as seriously  to compromise  his 
freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract.20 Such will be that case where 
the other party controls  a network of similar contracts  which have a cumula- 
tive effect on competition and imposes the terms of the contract  on the party 
claiming damages.21 
 
It is interesting,  but probably disappointing, to learn that in its judgment  af- 
ter this preliminary reference the High Court denied, on factual grounds,  any 
claim of injury by Mr Crehan, without even mentioning the ECJ judgment.22 
 
 
V. Comments 
 
1.  The ‘Courage’ doctrine 
 
Courage can be interpreted as the recognition by the ECJ of a principle of a 
Community right 23 to damages for victims of infringements of the EC com- 
petition  rules.  The  Court indeed  stresses  that  the  full effectiveness  of the 
competition rules requires  Member  States to grant  any individual  to claim 
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by a conduct liable to restrict 
competition. 
 
Paradoxically,  by focusing on its rejection of the English rule which denies a 
party to an unlawful contract  in all circumstances the right to claim damages 
from the other  party,  and thus including  parties to the unlawful  contract  in 
the circle of beneficiaries of the right to claim damages, the ECJ has not clari- 
fied the concept  of ‘any individual’ in a non contractual situation,  which in 
itself  does  not  raise  the  same  questions,   thus  leaving  some  doubt   as  to 
whether this expression includes eg consumers to whom the prejudice suffer- 
 
 
 
20 Paragraph 33 of the judgment. 
21 Paragraph 34 of the judgment. 
22 N. Reich, ‘The “Courage” Doctrine: encouraging or discouraging  compensation for an- 
titrust  Injuries?’, (2005) 42 Common Market  Law Review 35 et seq, 39. 
23 In this sense: W. van Gerven, ‘Substantive remedies for private enforcement  of EC anti- 
trust rules before national courts’, in J. Stuyck / H. Gilliams (eds), Modernization of Eu- 
ropean Competition Law (Antwerp:  Intersentia, 2002); A. Kominos, ‘New prospects for 
private enforcement  of EC Competition law’, (2002) 39 Common Market  Law Review 
473; Reich, n 22 above, 38. 
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ed by innocent  members  of customers  of a cartel have been passed? 24  It is 
submitted that, as a matter of principle, they are included. Nevertheless many 
questions  remain.25   Particularly important for consumers  is the well known 
discussion in competition law of ‘passing on’, which can be used as a defence 
by the undertakings faced with a claim for damages for infringement of the 
competition rules, especially price cartels or abuse of a dominant position  by 
the charging of excessive prices. Where the plaintiff is, for example, a retailer, 
the defendant  will argue that the plaintiff will have passed the surcharge paid 
on to customers,  ie the consumers.  This defence was considered  possible in 
Denmark, Germany  and Italy.26   If this is so, one could  be tempted  to infer 
from it that the final consumer  should be in a good starting position  to claim 
damages, but  for want  of adequate  procedures (such as class actions)  con- 
sumers do not seem, to date, to have been successful in claiming damages for 
competition law infringements.27  Moreover,  although  the national  reporters 
in the study by Waelbroeck,  Slater & Even-Soshan 28, agree on the theoretical 
possibility  for indirect purchasers  to bring claims, they mention  that the lack 
of clarity on this point, the difficulties in proving the causal link, and the exist- 
ence of the ‘passing on’ defence bring into question  the practical possibilities 
for  such  claims. Suggestions  for  facilitating  claims  by  indirect  purchasers 
ranged from clarification of the law to ensure standing rights of indirect 
purchasers  to the creation  of a specific legal basis for indirect  purchasers  to 
bring claims. A recent judgment of the Italian Corte di Cassazione shows that 
actions for damages by final consumers  in case of violations of the competi- 
tion rules may be rendered  difficult by rules on jurisdiction and by questions 
on the precise qualification of the action (action in tort on the basis of Article 
2043 Codice civile (C.c.) or Article 1337 C.c.: culpa in contrahendo?).29 
 
2.  Contract  law aspects 
 
The consequences of Courage for tort actions have been analysed by Norbert 
Reich.30  In these comments I would like to address some consequences for 
contract  law. 
 
24 See also Reich, n 22 above, 38–39. 
25 See Reich, n 22 above, 38–39. 
26 See D.  Waelbroeck  / D.  Slater / G.  Even-Soshan  (eds), Study  on  the  Conditions of 
Claims for damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (Brussels, 2004) 
(available on the web site of DG Comp). 
27 Waelbroeck / Slater / Even-Soshan,  n 26 above, 10. 
28 Ibid, 10. 
29 F. Afferni / F. Wenzel Bulst, ‘Kartellrechtliche  Schadensersatzansprüche von Verbrau- 
chern’ (case note: Corte  di Cassazione,  9 December  2002) Zeitschrift  für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 2005, 143 et seq, 150–151. 
30 Reich, n 22 above. 
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One contract  law aspect has been addressed by the judgment:  a national rule 
cannot per se exclude the right of a party to a contract violating Article 81 EC 
to claim damages from the other party, but the Court has recognised that na- 
tional law can limit that right on the basis of the principle that a party should 
not benefit from its own wrongdoing. I will come back to that question  here- 
inafter (see V 2 d) ‘nemo auditor’). 
 
For the rest the Court does not give a lot of guidance. What does the consid- 
eration that Member States have to grant any individual to claim damages for 
loss caused to him by a contract or by a conduct liable to restrict competition 
mean for contract  law? 
 
I shall first turn  to the nature  of contractual loss in case of competition in- 
fringements  (V 2 a)) and the problem  of causation (V 2 b)). Thereafter  I shall 
briefly  examine  the  problems  which  can arise under  national  law deriving 
from the distinction  between actions for damages ex contractu and actions for 
damages ex delicto (V 2 c)). 
 
a) nature of the contractual  loss 
 
In  particular  the  question  arises  what  kind  of  claim  for  damages  can  be 
brought by a contract  party under the Courage doctrine? 
 
A first, classic, hypothesis, is that of non-performance.31 A claim for damages 
for non-performance will obviously  not be based on a violation of the com- 
petition rules. On the other hand, where a claim for damages for non-perform- 
ance is brought by a party  to a contract,  the defendant  party  can invoke the 
nullity  of the clause (or as the case may be of the contract)  that violates the 
competition rules to justify  his refusal to perform.  This raises the question 
whether the ‘guilty’ party should be barred from such a defence. The answers 
given to that question  may differ from Member  Sate to Member  Sate (see V 
2 d)). 
 
Courage  did  not  concern  a claim for  damages  for  non  performance.32  Mr. 
Crehan,  the pub owner, brought a counter  claim for damages based on a pre- 
judice caused by an obligation to buy beer exclusively from Courage at prices 
 
 
 
31 See Art 9:501 of the Principles of European Contract law: Art 9:501 (ex Art 4.501): Right 
to Damages: (1) The aggrieved party is entitled to damages for loss caused by the other 
party’s  non-performance which  is not  excused  under  Article  8:108; (2) The  loss for 
which  damages  are recoverable  includes:  (a) non-pecuniary loss; and  (b) future  loss 
which is reasonably  likely to occur. 
32 In the Courage case Mr. Crehan  refused to pay for the deliveries invoking that the beer 
tie was contrary to Art 81 EC. 
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which  drove  him  out  of business  (because  his competitors could  buy  the 
same beer at lower prices). 
 
This raises the question  of what kind of loss Crehan  was asking compensa- 
tion for. Obviously it was not  a loss caused by the tie-in (the clause which 
was allegedly contrary to Article 81 EC in itself), but the fact that the tie-in 
prevented  him from escaping from a contract  which imposed too high prices 
in comparison with competitors. 
 
In other words, the tie-in was not by definition  a clause causing damage and 
the damage was not solely caused by the tie-in, but by the tie-in and the cir- 
cumstances  external  to  the  contract.  This  is not  surprising  in competition 
matters.  Article  81 EC  prohibits agreements  restricting  competition, ie, ac- 
cording to present insights, agreements which effectively (and not merely 
formally)  restrict  competition in the market.  For each agreement  an econo- 
mic appraisal has to be made, unless there is a group exemption.  Vertical re- 
strictions,  such as those in the Courage case are largely exempted under Re- 
gulation 2790/1999 if the market share of the supplier in the relevant market 
does not exceed 30 %, but certain clauses are black-listed,  meaning that they 
are not automatically exempted and will generally not benefit from a positive 
appraisal.  This is eg the case with  an exclusive purchasing  obligation,  as in 
Courage  (see Article 5 of Regulation  2790/1999), if it is not concluded  for a 
definite period not exceeding five years. In other words where a supplier with 
a market share of not more than 30 % imposes on its distributor an exclusive 
purchasing  obligation  for a definite period  of not  more  than five years, the 
clause is per se compatible with Article 81 EC, although in fact it does restrict 
competition and may cause a competitive  prejudice to a distributor, eg a dis- 
tributor having to pay a higher price for the products than (some of) its com- 
petitors, as the case may be without objective justification for that unequal, ie 
discriminatory, treatment. If the supplier is not dominant, he is not under an 
obligation to treat his distributors equally. 
 
Thus  Courage  also raises questions  regarding  causation.  They  will be ad- 
dressed hereinafter  (see V 2 b)). 
 
In the case of a restrictive agreement contrary to Article 81 EC or Article 82 
EC 33 (or the national equivalents of these articles), a party to that agreement 
may suffer from various kinds of losses depending on the nature of the agree- 
 
 
33 Art 82 EC prohibits abuse of a dominant position,  which is usually unilateral conduct. 
However, in Ahmed Saeed (Case C-66/86  [1989] ECR 803 [ECJ]) the ECJ decided that 
Art 82 EC can apply to an agreement contrary to Art 81 EC, namely where one of the 
parties is dominant and abuses that position  by imposing  unfair contract  terms on the 
other. 
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ment and of the restrictive clause or practice. In the case of a distributorship 
agreement,  the distributor may eg suffer direct pecuniary  loss as a result of 
excessive or discriminatory prices imposed by a supplier in a dominant posi- 
tion (violation of Article 82 EC). A party to a horizontal illegal market shar- 
ing agreement may suffer a loss of business opportunities (and hence of turn- 
over)  as a result  of the  faithful  execution  of the  agreement.  A distributor, 
again, may suffer a loss by complying with an illegal export ban in a distribu- 
torship  agreement. In all these cases the loss is likely to be directly caused by 
the competition infringement, although,  here again, the causal link between 
loss and infringement may be difficult to establish. In the case of an export 
ban some loss may be relatively easy to establish on the basis of orders from 
abroad that the distributor was not entitled to honour, but how can the entire 
sum of the lucrums cessans, the lost opportunities, including the orders which 
were not made because of the existence of a closed distribution system (which 
according to national contract law would generally also be covered), be estab- 
lished? 
 
b)  Causation 
 
A person  claiming damages has to prove  the existence of a causal link be- 
tween  the generating  fact (the tortious conduct,  the non  performance of a 
contract,  the insertion  of an anti-competitive clause in the contract,  and so 
on) and the loss he has suffered. It is well known  that there is not one single 
theory  of causation in European contract  law. Courage does not address this 
question.  The Francovich case law on which the Courage  doctrine  is (partly) 
based and which could therefore  serve as source of inspiration  hardly  gives 
any guidance. In addition,  in contract  law causation is rarely an issue: the ag- 
grieved party is entitled to damages fro the loss caused by the other’s party’s 
non-performance. Loss caused by a violation in contractu of the competition 
rules is more like loss caused in tort. 
 
c)  Contract  and tort – contractual  and extra-contractual damages 
 
In the absence of a uniform  concept  of contract  law in Europe,  there  is no 
clear dividing line between  contract  law and tort  law.34  In addition,  in some 
legal systems there are rather  strict rules on the separation  between  actions 
for damages ex contractu and actions for damages ex delicto. This is eg the 
 
 
 
34 See C. von Bar / U. Drobnig, Study  on Property Law  and Non-contractual Liability 
Law  as they  relate to Contract  Law,  Submitted  to the European Commission Health 
and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, SANCO B5-1000/02/000574,  para- 
graph 19. 
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case in French  law (and in Belgian) law, but  not  or less so in German  and 
English law.35  Under  French  and Belgian law a claim for damages based on 
tort  law will be rejected where the alleged fault and damage are purely  con- 
tractual, in the sense that in the absence of a contract  there would have been 
no fault or damage. Courage does not make that distinction  – and there was 
certainly no reason to do so. 
 
An action for damages for violation of competition law by a contract  party is 
not  an action for non-performance, although,  as in the case of Mr. Crehan, 
the loss may be primarily  caused by the existence of a contract.  The fault is 
contractual and  non-contractual. The  loss is in a sense purely  contractual 
(had Mr. Crehan  not be bound  by the tie-in he could have avoided the loss as 
a result of too high prices). 
 
Many implementing  provisions  of Article 81 EC (such as black listed clauses 
in block exemption  regulations)  are purely contractual, ie they do not envis- 
age the violation of Article 81 EC absent an agreement (eg a ‘concerted prac- 
tice’). 
 
Courage shows that actions for damages by parties to a contract violating the 
competition rules put into question  the divide between contract  and tort. 
 
d)  ‘Nemo auditor’ 
 
In Courage the ECJ has clearly decided that national  law should  not bar as 
such a party to a contract  to claim damages for violations of EC competition 
law. However the Court recognises the principle  existing in most legal sys- 
tems that  a litigant  should  not  profit  from  his own  unlawful  conduct.  The 
Court also accepts that  national  law denies  a party  to  an anti-competitive 
contract  the right to obtain damages from the other party where he has ‘sig- 
nificant responsibility for the distortion of competition’. The question  thus 
arises whether the ECJ has not solely recognised the ‘nemo auditor’ principle 
to the extent that  it bars a party  to an anti-competitive contract  who bears 
‘significant responsibility’  for the distortion of competition to claim damages 
from the other  party?  Could  ‘nemo auditor’  as it is understood in the com- 
mon tradition of the Member States (assuming that the right to claim damages 
for violations  of Article 81 and 82 EC is a Community law right) or in the 
national  law applicable  (assuming  that  that  right is merely  national)  still be 
invoked where it would lead to rejecting a claim for damages by a party who 
 
 
 
35 See H. Beale / A. Hartkamp / H. Kötz  / D. Tallon (eds), Cases, Materials and Text  on 
Contract Law, Ius Commune Casebooks on the Common Law of Europe (Oxford:  Hart 
Publishing,  2002) 69-70; von Bar / Drobnig, n 34 above, paragraph  280 et seq. 
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has only  an insignificant  responsibility in distorting competition (while he 
may have had a much heavier responsibility in the shaping of the contract and 
would on that ground have to face ‘nemo auditor’)? And, finally: what is ‘sig- 
nificant responsibility’? It is for the ECJ to clarify these questions  when they 
arise. 
 
 
VI. Concluding  remarks 
 
Courage  has established  two  important principles:  1) a victim  of conduct 
which violates Article 81 or 82 EC has a right to damages and 2) this right is 
also given to a party to a contract  violating Article 81 EC who does not bear 
significant responsibility for that violation. Subject to the principle mention- 
ed under  2), Courage also recognises ‘nemo auditur’.  The question  whether 
the right thus conferred  on victims of violations of Articles 81 and 82 EC is a 
Community law right or a right which the Member Sates have to grant under 
national law is not decided. Many other questions remain. In particular Cour- 
age raises the question to what extent principles and rules of contract law will 
and can play a role in the design of this right to damages, which rather seems 
to have a tort law basis. 
 
Jules Stuyck,  Professor  of European and  Economic  law, K.U.Leuven  and 
R. U.  Nijmegen,   Partner   Liedekerke.   Wolters.   Waelbroeck.   Kirkpatrick, 
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